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Abstract
Trends of de-democratization across Europe and the Americas are emerging, along with opposition to gender equality and
threats to previous gender equality policy gains. Yet de-democratization has been barely analysed through the lens of gen-
der equality, and so far, efforts to systematically analyse the implications for inclusive democracy and the representation
of gender interests are lacking. Backsliding in gender policies, and new forms of feminist engagement with hostile states
and publics, also raise new challenges to the literature on gender and politics. In this article we explore gender equality
policy backsliding in fragile democracies. Backsliding and de-democratization processes in these contexts pose a series of
important challenges to howwe have thought about gender policy change in progressive, mainly Western democratic con-
texts until now. We propose a conceptual framework discussing these two conceptually interesting realms: backsliding in
gender equality policies, and feminist responses to backsliding. We illustrate our framework with empirical observations
from four backsliding or temporarily backsliding Central and Eastern European countries: Croatia, Hungary, Poland and
Romania. With our article we aim to contribute to the understanding of gendered aspects of de-democratization both in
gender and politics literature and in mainstream democratization literature.
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1. Introduction
The last decades since the 1995 Beijing Women’s World
Conference can be seen globally as years of significant
progress in the adoption of gender equality policies in
fields as diverse as political participation, labour mar-
kets, care and violence against women. Yet, this progress
is currently under attack. Trends of backsliding and de-
democratization have emerged across Europe and the
Americas, mainly coinciding with the recent economic
and financial crisis. We see articulated opposition to gen-
der equality and threats to previous gender equality pol-
icy gains. This raises new challenges for the literature on
gender and politics. Women’s rights are particularly vul-
nerable in fragile and nascent democracies where such
rights have been more recently established and where
the space of civil society actors to defend such rights is
limited and even shrinking (Baker et al., 2017; Carothers
& Brechenmacher, 2014; Rutzen, 2015).While significant
attention has been devoted to democratic backsliding
(Bermeo, 2016; Greskovits, 2015), there is a striking lack
of research into the gendered aspects and implications
of democratic backsliding.
In this article we propose a conceptual framework to
analyse and reveal the consequences of these processes
for inclusive democracy. The quality of democracy can
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be assessed on the degree of its inclusiveness and rep-
resentativeness of societal interests, and more specifi-
cally its responsiveness to women’s interests (McBride &
Mazur, 2010, p. 10).We ask: what does backslidingmean
for gender equality policies and what are its implications
for women’s rights? How do feminists respond to and re-
sist backsliding? And how can we capture the impact of
feminist resistance in changing largely hostile contexts?
To develop our conceptual framework we use empiri-
cal illustrations from the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) region, which has been at the forefront of back-
sliding in gender equality policies in recent years (Kikas,
2016; Krizsan & Roggeband, 2018; Selewa, 2016). We fo-
cus on Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, which ex-
hibit particularly strong but also diverse patterns of re-
trenchment: some radical, others incremental, some on-
going over long periods of time, others stopped by im-
pressive patterns of civil society resistance (Kikas, 2016;
Krizsan & Roggeband, 2018; Selewa, 2016). We do not
use our empirical cases to explain causality in a neat
comparative model, but rather to stipulate patterns of
backsliding where those emerge, and feminist responses
to it. The patterns we witness may not only be typical
for the region, and so could provide important lessons
for understanding mechanisms of gender equality policy
backsliding and responses to it in other parts of Europe
and beyond1.
In the first part of the article we develop a concep-
tual framework to map the implications of current at-
tacks on gender equality and women’s rights on gender
equality policies and political representation of women.
Across the CEE region we see official political discourses
changing from positions that were either largely support-
ive or silent on gender equality to openly challenging pre-
viously adopted and accepted gender equality policy po-
sitions (Krizsan & Roggeband, 2018). Do such discursive
attacks translate to policy dismantling? We build on pub-
lic policy literature on policy dismantling, recent work on
democratic backsliding, and studies in gender and poli-
tics explaining progress in gender equality policies to ex-
plore the conditions of decline and reversal of gender
equality policies and their impact on the political repre-
sentation of women.
In the second part of the article, we turn to the
drivers of gender equality policies, namely women’s
rights activists (Beckwith, 2013; Htun & Weldon, 2012;
McBride & Mazur, 2010), to ask: how does democratic
backsliding affect the voice and standing of women’s
rights advocates? The participation and inclusion of
women in the realm of politics are key to struggling
against persisting inequalities. Fair and free elections can
only serve this to a limited extent. For underrepresented
groups, such as women, inclusive democracy also means
empowerment and inclusion in policy and governance
processes through civil society organizations represent-
ing the voice of such groups. The widely documented
closure of civic space (Baker et al., 2017; Carothers &
Brechenmacher, 2014) disempowers women’s organiz-
ing. It thus makes it difficult for women to prevent the
reversal of rights and dismantling of gender equality poli-
cies, and to contest the promotion of legislation and poli-
cies detrimental to gender equality. We use empirical ob-
servations fromwomen’s activism in the four backsliding
CEE countries to explore patterns of response and resis-
tance to increased state hostility.
2. Backsliding of Gender Policies
Democracy scholar Bermeo defines democratic backslid-
ing as the “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of
the political institutions that sustain an existing democ-
racy” (2016, p. 5). Greskovits takes a less institutional
approach by defining it as a “destabilization or even
a reversal in the direction of democratic development”
(Greskovits, 2015, p. 28). Both view backsliding as an
ongoing, gradual process rather than a turning point
that can be clearly identified in time. Others link demo-
cratic backsliding to a cultural backlash against ongo-
ing social changes including progress in gender equality
(Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016; Norris, 2016). Yet, most de-
democratization writings concentrate on more general
institutional aspects of democracy and pay less atten-
tion to backsliding in terms of representativeness and
inclusiveness of democracies (Tilly, 2007; Walby, 2015).
In order to capture these dimensions there is a need for
a more comprehensive conceptualization of democratic
backsliding that takes into account regression in gender
representativeness. We suggest that Pitkin’s (1967) clas-
sic distinction between descriptive, substantive and sym-
bolic representation can best capture the dimensions
of inclusive democracy and serve as a useful starting
point to comprehensively conceptualize gender equality
backsliding. Descriptive representation can be captured
through inclusive policy processes, substantive represen-
tation can be analysed by looking at policy content, while
symbolic representation can be analysed through discur-
sive construction of women’s and gender equality issues
by critical political actors. We use various bodies of lit-
erature to develop a concept of backsliding along these
three dimensions.
Policy literature mainly operates on the assumption
of institutional stability and incremental policy change,
and there is far less extensive discussion on policy dis-
mantling and reversals (Bauer, Green-Pedersen, Héritier,
& Jordan, 2012; Bauer & Knill, 2014). More recent lit-
erature focuses on policy dismantling but neglects to
look at two aspects that are important for gender poli-
cies: changes in inclusive policy processes, and changes
in symbolic representation. Bauer et al. (2012) define pol-
icy dismantling as:
1 Data for our analysis comes partly from our previous comparative project focusing on the development of policies against violence against women
in these countries. This data is complemented with desk and media research and interviews with feminist activists and femocrats conducted in the
four countries.
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A change of a direct, indirect, hidden or symbolic na-
ture that either diminishes the number of policies in
a particular area, reduces the number of policy instru-
ments used and/or lowers their intensity. It can in-
volve changes to these core elements of policy and/or
it can be achieved by manipulating the capacities to
implement and supervise them. (p. 4)
Bauer et al. conceptualize dismantling along two di-
mensions: policy density and intensity. Density refers to
changes in the number of policies in a given policy field,
while intensity refers to the depth of intervention (2012,
p. 34). Qualitative erosion of policies such as refram-
ing and/or co-optation of content (Krizsan & Roggeband,
2018; Lombardo,Meier, & Verloo, 2009; Stratigaki, 2005)
are particularly fundamental problems in the field of gen-
der policies and could be seen as an aspect of changes in
policy intensity.
In recent years, two strands of literature have de-
veloped that address backsliding in the realm of gen-
der equality. Firstly, increased (discursive) opposition to
gender equality mobilized by a broad range of conserva-
tive, nationalist and religious actors has been widely dis-
cussed (Kovats & Poim, 2015; Kuhar, 2015; Kuhar & Pa-
ternotte, 2017; Verloo, 2018). Explicit opposition to gen-
der equality principles is a form of backlash that partic-
ularly challenges morality and sexuality aspects of gen-
der equality through political statements and in some in-
stances also through policy proposals. We see here back-
sliding in symbolic representation of gender equality.
The second strand of literature focuses on the poli-
tics and policy reversals following the economic crisis in
Europe and discusses how the crisis has strengthened
neoliberal trends and has led to backsliding in the con-
text of gendered austerity measures (Bettio et al., 2012;
Kantola & Lombardo, 2017; Walby, 2015). Austerity mea-
sures have resulted in increasing social inequality and dis-
crimination against women (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017;
Karamessini & Rubery, 2013). While anti-discrimination
policies and other legal instruments remained in place,
cuts were prominent in budgets and institutional frame-
works, and have led to a decreased inclusion of women’s
groups. Backsliding is captured here both in terms of sub-
stantive and descriptive representation.
These bodies of literature point both to stability
and to vulnerability in terms of institutional frameworks,
implementation and accountability, and to discursive
threats to gender equality objectives. They also indicate
issue specificity within the wider range of gender pol-
icy issues. It has been argued earlier that various gender
equality policy sub-issues are characterized by different
policy dynamics, including diverse patterns of actor dy-
namics, different dynamics of political representation, in-
stitutional friction and veto points, and that this may re-
sult in differences in policy attention (Annesley, Engeli,
& Gains, 2015; Htun & Weldon, 2012; McBride & Mazur,
2010). Morality issues such as sexual and reproductive
rights are particularly sensitive to contestation (Kovats
& Poim, 2015; Kuhar, 2015; Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017).
Class-based issues emerge as a topic of political struggle
in the context of the economic and financial crisis (Bettio
et al., 2012; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017; Karamessini &
Rubery, 2013; Krizsan & Zentai, 2017). Legal frameworks
embedded in European Union (EU) norms may be less
prone to backsliding.
While these two strands of literature provide impor-
tant insights, there is a lack of systematic analysis of the
implications of discursive attacks on gender equality poli-
cies, and the scope of policy backsliding. In the next sec-
tion we develop a conceptual framework for analysing
gender policy backsliding. We combine ideas on policy
dismantling and democratic backsliding with ideas about
discursive opposition to gender equality, thus covering
aspects of backsliding in terms of descriptive, substan-
tive and symbolic representation.
2.1. A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Gender
Policy Backsliding
Certain patterns of backsliding in gender policies emerge,
but it remains unclear how systematic these patterns are
and what they imply for inclusive democracy and the
representation of gender, particularly in the context of
fragile democracies. Better conceptual work is needed
to bring various dimensions of backsliding together in a
sound conceptual framework (Goertz & Mazur, 2008).
Gender equality policy progress is often measured
along two criteria: the framing of policy content along
the lines of women’s movement framing, and an inclu-
sive policy subsystem integrating women’s movement
actors (Krizsan & Roggeband, 2018; McBride & Mazur,
2010). We complement this framework with other el-
ements from the previously discussed literature. From
the policy dismantling literature, we take the observa-
tion that policy termination is rare and that we need
more gradual measurements of change towards erosion
or dismantling. We also borrow the idea of backsliding
as a process rather than a fixed turning point in time.
From the gender and politics literature we take the em-
phasis on framing of policies, the erosion of accountabil-
ity mechanisms, and the symbolic importance of openly
oppositional policymaker discourses which delegitimize
gender equality policies and represent gender issues in
exclusionary ways. We propose to define backsliding in
the field of gender equality policies with reference to
the substantive normative content of gender equality as
a benchmark. But we see gender equality as an empty
signifier, the meaning of which may differ depending on
political, social and cultural contexts (Lombardo et al.,
2009). To use a substantive but contextualized approach,
we define backsliding as states going back on previous
commitments to gender equality norms as defined in
their respective political contexts.
We operationalize policy backsliding in the field of
gender equality along four complementary dimensions
which also correspond to symbolic, substantive and de-
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scriptive aspects of representation (Pitkin, 1967): 1) dis-
cursive (de)legitimisation of gender policy objectives;
2) dismantling and reframing existent policies; 3) under-
mining implementation; and 4) erosion of accountabil-
ity and inclusion mechanisms. This multi-dimensional
framework allows us to examine how backsliding pat-
terns vary across specific gender equality issues and
across countries, while it also allows for a gradual rather
than a dichotomous approach to backsliding (Goertz &
Mazur, 2008). Below we elaborate on each dimension
and provide some empirical illustrations of it.
2.1.1. Discursive Delegitimization of Gender Equality
Policies
A widely noted and prominent aspect of policy backslid-
ing is changes in official political discourses from posi-
tions largely supportive or silent on gender equality to
statements that openly challenge gender equality objec-
tives, often going in opposition to a country’s formally
adopted and accepted policy positions (Krizsan & Rogge-
band, 2018). Oppositional statements on gender equal-
ity made by high-level political actors who are part of
the governing structure or governing political party ques-
tion the legitimacy of gender equality as a goal and dis-
credit existing policies. Backsliding here means increas-
ingly hostile policy processes, where anti-gender equal-
ity positions negatively influence how policies are per-
ceived and implemented.
A particularly strong example of discursive opposi-
tion is in Poland where, since the end of 2015, the
populist right-wing government has used a strong anti-
gender equality rhetoric in which ‘gender ideology’ fea-
tures as amajor threat to Polish society and Catholic fam-
ily values. Statements that challenge gender equality are
issued on a regular basis by government officials. Similar
statements are also issued occasionally by government
officials in Croatia (Kikas, 2016), and more recently in
Hungary as well (Felix, 2015).
2.1.2. Policy Dismantling and Reframing
Backsliding may take the form of dismantling existing
policies. However, more often changes take place by
amending policies so that their priorities or objectives
change. Backsliding may occur when a policy problem
is radically reframed so that the new frame contrasts
with gender equality meanings or allows for contrast-
ing interpretations. Reversal of policy frames may also
happen when gender-sensitive issues present in the di-
agnostic or prognostic frames of policy regimes disap-
pear. Reframing existent policies from targeting equal
opportunities to, for example, protecting family values
or refocusing care around the family unit, while allow-
ing for their continued operation, is a pattern that can
be observed to reverse progress in gender equality pol-
icy regimes (Krizsan & Zentai, 2017). An example of this
is Croatia where a new Criminal Code adopted in 2011,
and entering into force on 1 January 2013, removed the
specific prohibition of “violent, abusive, or particularly
insolent conduct” within a family (Article 215A). Fam-
ily relations were kept only as an aggravated circum-
stance for other, more severe criminal offences, such
as injuries, severe and extremely severe injuries, threat
or coercion (Manjoo, 2013). Repealing these specific do-
mestic violence provisionsmeans that domestic violence
offences can now only be prosecuted asmisdemeanours,
as the coercive control element is no longer part of
the Criminal Code (Advocates for Human Rights & Au-
tonomous Women’s House, 2015). In addition, a new
Family Lawwas drafted to “support traditional family val-
ues” (Stubbs, 2016). The Law contains provisions that op-
pose gender equality and disregard the power dynam-
ics in domestic violence, such as mandatory mediation
in divorce cases, serious consequences for a parent who
“refuses to cooperate” in raising children, and fines for
parentswho prevent contact with children. Furthermore,
the term “domestic violence” was replaced with the am-
biguous “highly conflictual relations”. The new Criminal
Code and the Family Law brought the family protection
framing to the level of statute. The Constitution of Croa-
tia was also amended following a popular referendum
in 2013 initiated by conservative actors, but tacitly sup-
ported by the government, to limit family and marriage
rights to heterosexual couples.
2.1.3. Undermining Implementation Arrangements
Reversal and dismantling of policies can also take place at
the level of the institutional design of a policy regime. In-
stitutional design may include mechanisms such as coor-
dinating authorities, intergovernmental and other part-
nerships, networks of private and public entities, and
contractual relationships. Policies can be abandoned by
not continuing their ongoing programmatic processes or
made impossible by defunding. The literature about the
gendered implications of austerity measures points to
stalling strategic programming processes, closing gender
equality institutions or cutting funds that make their op-
eration feasible (Bettio et al., 2012; Kantola & Lombardo,
2017; Krizsan & Zentai, 2017).
Dismantling of institutional arrangements is a rela-
tively easy and low-key form of rolling back policies. One
illustrative example is the Hungarian casewhere, starting
from 2010, the Fidesz government dismantled most of
the gender equality structures put in place under the pre-
vious government. The gender equality unit was closed
and re-established with only two people on board, un-
der the deputy state secretary for Family and Population
Policy. This implied both a downsizing and reframing of
gender equality policy objectives into family policy ob-
jectives. The consultative Gender Equality Council has
not been convened since 2010. The implementation of
the 2010 National Gender Equality strategy was imme-
diately stalled after the elections, and no activities were
launched under it by the new government. Funds were
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diverted from gender equality objectives towards objec-
tives opposing it. For example, money coming from the
EU’s PROGRESS fund was used for an anti-abortion cam-
paign in ways that were challenged by EC Commissioner
Viviane Reading (Euractiv, 2011).
2.1.4. Erosion of Inclusion and Accountability
Mechanisms
Accountability processes especially by means of inclu-
sive policy making and consultation processes including
women’s rights advocates are a critical element in the
field of gender policy progress (Ferree & Gamson, 2003;
McBride & Mazur, 2010). Policy inclusion is seen by gen-
der and politics literature as a policy outcome in itself,
but also as a factor securing more equitable representa-
tion for gender interests. As such, reversal on policy in-
clusion has consequences for the backsliding of gender
policies. Gender equality policies may be undermined if
women’s rights advocates are not meaningfully involved
in policy processes beyond agenda-setting (Krizsan &
Roggeband, 2018). Essential elements identified in back-
sliding in the context of the economic crisis are the
breaking of accountability loops and de-democratizing
of policy-making processes (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017;
Krizsan & Zentai, 2017; Walby, 2015). The most direct
challenge is dismantling formal consultation structures
such as councils or committees established for sustain-
able communication between civil society groups repre-
senting gender equality and governments. Formal con-
sultation mechanisms have been particularly hit in Hun-
gary, Romania and Poland. In Romania, even parliament
was side-lined by decision-making through executive or-
ders. Formal consultation processes have also been cur-
tailed by selective access to consultation based on gov-
ernment preferences. Selective inclusion of civil society
actors has led to the exclusion of rights-based groups
from consultation and their replacement by alterna-
tive groups in Hungary (Krizsan & Zentai, 2017), Croatia
and Poland.
2.2. Dismantling Patterns and Strategies
The advantage of using amulti-dimensional framework is
that it enables a detailed and systematic analysis of vari-
ous dimensions of backsliding across countries, and spe-
cific gender issues. In general, we expect that backsliding
will affect some policy areas more than others, i.e., back-
sliding will be more prominent along some of our four
dimensions in some gender policy issues. In addition to
this, we expect to find variations between countries re-
lated to specific strategies that politicians may employ in
each context. Bauer et al. (2012) point to four different
dismantling strategies. Active dismantling is themost vis-
ible form, where politicians clearly and openly express
their wish to dismantle or end a policy and take actions
to do this. Secondly, and in contrast to active disman-
tling, politicians may claim their intention to dismantle,
but these declarations are not acted upon or serve some
other objective, and hence remain symbolic. Thirdly, dis-
mantling decisions may be moved to another political
arena, by manipulating the organizational or procedural
basis of a policy or transferring the policy to another gov-
ernment level or to a (newly established) agency. Finally,
the subtlest strategy is dismantling by defaults, where
governments simply do not enact or execute policies,
whichmay lead to policy extinction. Change ismadewith-
out formal decision; it has little visibility but may affect
policy instruments, institutional structures, or account-
ability mechanisms. Bauer et al. propose that disman-
tling strategies depend on the political ideology and pref-
erence of politicians, but are also situational, so depend
on available opportunities and constraints, and public
and political support or opposition.
The typology is a useful starting point to think about
dismantling strategies, but we propose to add some
more elements to it. First, we consider the pace of dis-
mantling as an additional essential element. Processes
of dismantling can be rapid, which is often related to
drastic cuts, ormore incremental, which comes from low-
key, small, “under the radar” forms of dismantling. Sec-
ond, we consider that strategies will be issue-specific
and entail different rationales and justification. We con-
tend that the type of dismantling strategy chosen to roll
back gender equality policies creates specific opportuni-
ties and constraints for feminist activists to respond or
resist. Low key, incremental processes of policy backslid-
ing remain largely invisible to the wider public and may
therefore be more difficult to address than radical and
drastic cuts openly announced by governments. Visible
forms of dismantling are more likely to generate protest
from awider public and help activists to orchestratemas-
sive protests to oppose government plans. Yet, feminist
counter-strategies also depend on the extent of direct
hostility or repression. This is a point that is left undis-
cussed in the policy dismantling literature and where we
need social movement literature to better understand
opportunities and constraints to respond to and/or strug-
gle against policy dismantling.
3. Backsliding States and Feminist Resilience
The emergence of openly hostile and closing states
presents new challenges to women’s rights groups in
the CEE region. Along with Ferree and Mueller (2004)
we propose the use of an open and broad definition
of women’s movements as mobilizations based on ap-
peals to women as a constituency, and thus as an or-
ganized strategy. With them we define feminism as the
broad goal of challenging and changing unequal gender
relations: “whether or not individuals or groups choose
to call themselves feminist, their goal of empowering
women should be considered feminist” (2006, p. vii). This
open framework allows an examination of the different
forms and faces of women’s organizing for gender equal-
ity within and across countries.
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Hostile states can hinder movement actors in step-
ping up against gender policy backsliding. During the
democratization period, women’s rights groups strongly
relied on transactional activism (Krizsan & Roggeband,
2018; Tarrow & Petrova, 2007) rather than grassroots
activism to pursue gender policy change, meaning that
they focused on networking with other organizations,
including state actors. It is through strategically chosen
patterns of engagement with the state and with other
civil society actors that gender policy progress could take
place across the region (Krizsan & Roggeband, 2018).
Movements with diverse organizational patterns that
combined insider and outsider strategies to engage the
statewere themost successful in gendering adopted poli-
cies (Krizsan & Roggeband, 2018). The increased hos-
tility towards critical civil society organizations in gen-
eral, and towards women’s rights organizations in par-
ticular, blocks earlier successful strategies of engaging
the state. Networking with state actors is marginalized
or becomes impossible. Preliminary evidence suggests
that women’s organizations are side-lined, persecuted or
co-opted by governments. This is in line with findings of
other studies on civil society and protests in backsliding
or (semi-)autocratic states.
3.1. Government Hostility to Women’s Organizations
Governments moving towards authoritarianism often
use methods of control to suppress civil society organiza-
tions they perceive as threatening. These methods may
include the creation by the state of seemingly civic or-
ganizations, often referred to as GONGOs, to influence
the realm of civil society in a way that directly supports
state power (Doyle, 2017); co-optation by using the re-
liance of independent organizations on state funding or
cooperation to control their activities; and repressive or
even violent actions ranging fromdisproportionate audit-
ing as a means of control to policing and violence, which
limit and disempower organizations (Baker et al., 2017).
These three forms of state hostility are also visible in the
CEE region and limit the space for women’s organizations
to cooperate with the state or act as critical outsiders.
In Hungary, Poland and Croatia we find governmen-
tal strategies to defund women’s rights organizations
and redirect public funds to alternative, government-
friendly women’s organizations. Women’s rights groups
inHungary have seen an unprecedented absence of fund-
ing under the Fidesz government, including the block-
ing of funding by non-state donors such as the Norwe-
gian Civil Grants (TASZ, 2016). In the meantime, fund-
ing has been increasingly directed towards conserva-
tive women’s groups and family protection groups. In
2013 an alternative coalition (Association of Hungarian
Women) was launched to challenge the place of the Hun-
garian Women’s Lobby in the European Women’s Lobby
and to delegate a representative to the European Insti-
tute for Gender Equality. Similarly, in Poland, govern-
ment officials like the Plenipotentiary for Civil Society
and Equal Treatment have stated that they seek to de-
velop a cadre of “conservative” NGOs that can focus
on topics such as women’s and family issues, discrim-
ination, and refugees/migration from a traditional per-
spective. The government created a competing organiza-
tion, the Confederation of Non-Governmental Initiatives
of Poland, that will presumably become the coordinating
body of the new community of government-organized
NGOs (Human Rights First, 2017, p. 16). In Croatia, the
women’s movement’s insider status has been severely
limited since 2011, when actors and rhetoric opposed
to gender equality strengthened and governmental allies
disappeared. Women’s groups are now rarely invited to
the negotiation table to discuss policy changes, though
remain external critics to the process (Krizsan & Rogge-
band, 2018). Family protection, men’s rights and other
conservative groups have infiltrated consultative mech-
anisms, frequently blocking policy progress. Previously
successful patterns of cooperation between women’s
rights groups and the state have faltered.
Co-optation of women’s rights groups has been par-
ticularly used in contexts where formalized state fund-
ing has been available for services provided by women’s
rights groups. In Croatia tension emerged between
women’s rights groups around issues of autonomy from
versus cooperation with the state, funding, and defini-
tions of domestic violence back in 2005 (Krizsan & Rogge-
band, 2018). This tension was overcome, to some ex-
tent, in domestic violence policy mobilizations during
2008. After 2008, however, the movement fragmented
once again. Leadership issues also struck the initially
successful Women’s Network. It is this dense (Mamula,
Vukmanić, Zore, Stanić, & Hojt, 2010) yet fragmented
women’smovement that had to face the increasingly hos-
tile context and state closure. One strategy used by the
state to restrain women’s groups, de-fund them or co-
erce them into cooperation was to tender funding avail-
able for services for victims of domestic violence. Ten-
dering needed extremely high investment of resources
by women’s groups as well as conforming to complex
protocols that were often contrary to feminist principles
(Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Autonomous
Women’s House, Zagreb, & Bulgarian Gender Research
Foundation, 2012). Conditionality imposed on women’s
groups and resulting patterns of dependency have long
been discussed (Alvarez, 1999; Ghodsee, 2004) in rela-
tion to neoliberal states. A move towards replacing pre-
viously earmarked state funding with tendering is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe,
but has gained new relevance as it has emerged together
with state hostility to and closure towards women’s
rights groups.
Repressive actions againstwomen’s rights groups can
range from regulatory tools such as excessive auditing
and surveillance to more violent and repressive tools
such as police searches, raiding of offices, holding com-
puters or even arrests of activists. They limit activism
both by means of threat but also by demanding unnec-
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essary and mostly unavailable resources for handling
excessive auditing. From 2013, waves of auditing and
raids took place in Hungary against several rights NGOs
(women’s rights, LGBT, civil rights) funded by the Norwe-
gian Civil Fund. Auditing procedures ran for years and
were closed down without any findings of irregularity
(TASZ, 2016). In a similar vein, in 2017 the Polish govern-
ment began a financial review of targeted “liberal” NGOs,
requiring many to produce documents in an audit-like
procedure for the first time. It ordered several organiza-
tions to return grant money, while withholding funding
from others (Human Rights First, 2017, p. 5). The police
raid on the offices of the main women’s rights organi-
zations in several Polish cities in October 2017 also ex-
emplifies this kind of threat and repression. The timing
of the raids, one day after women’s organizations had
staged anti-governmentmarches to protest the country’s
restrictive abortion law, suggest they are a tool of intim-
idation (The Guardian, 2017).
3.2. Movement Resistance and Survival
Emergent state hostility towards women’s rights advo-
cates has consequences for how women’s movements
can maintain their role in promoting democratic repre-
sentation of women’s interests. Movement capacity and
movement strategies of engagement with the state are
dimensions we previously took (Krizsan & Roggeband,
2018) to conceptualize movement influence on policy-
making. Both dimensions are affected by the forms of
state hostility discussed above. How do women’s move-
ments respond to this? Social movement literature is re-
markably silent about movement strategies under condi-
tions of democratic backsliding. Literature on responses
to the economic crisis points to instances of demise and
failure of movements, but in some cases also to revival
and maturing and the emergence of innovative forms
of resistance (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017; Krizsan & Zen-
tai, 2017). Feminist resilience and responses to back-
sliding will on the one hand depend on the capacity of
women’s movements and their strategies of state en-
gagement before backsliding, and on the other hand on
the modes and strategies of policy dismantling used by
governments, to which movements react. Movements
may react differently to active and symbolic dismantling
than to dismantling by default.
Empirically, we see divergent patterns of feminist re-
sistance to policy backsliding and state hostility emerge
in the four countries, and various ways of feminist cop-
ing with the context of hostility to gender and de-
democratization. We identify three strategies: disruptive
protest, newpatterns of coalition building, and abeyance
and demise.
3.2.1. Turn to Grassroots and Disruptive Protest
Women’smovements traditionally use less obtrusive per-
suasive strategies, including participation in consultation
processes or lobbying policymakers (Htun & Weldon,
2012). Yet, in the context of state hostility and closure,
more disruptive repertoires are required. These may re-
sult in more radically framed claims that are less open to
negotiation and also require different movement capac-
ities and infrastructure (Andrews, 2001). The strength
and capacity of movements before the period of back-
sliding will make a difference to whether such capacity
is available. Movements with diversified capacities (An-
drews, 2001) might be in a better position to turn to con-
frontational strategies.
The capacity and resilience of the Polish women’s
movement is well illustrated by the massive protest
against the government’s proposal for even more restric-
tive abortion regulations in October 2016 (Davis, 2016),
which ultimately led to the withdrawal of the proposal. It
also demonstrates the ability to successfully connect fem-
inist issues to wider democracy and human rights con-
cerns andmobilizations. Revival and diversification of the
Romanian women’s movement and its strategies around
the time of the economic crisis (Popa, 2015) is another
example of resilience. New actors—including young fem-
inists, professional women, as well as minority women’s
groups, in particular Romawomen’s advocates—entered
the field of women’s rights activism. This sparked newde-
bates that engaged more radically with feminism and in-
troduced more disruptive forms of activism.
3.2.2. New Patterns of Coalition Building
In the contexts of de-democratization, gender equal-
ity has come under attack together with other demo-
cratic values, human rights and rights of other vul-
nerable groups. These common external threats may
forge new coalitions (Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010)
and contribute to overcoming divisions (Borland, 2010).
Women’smovements in CEE countrieswere rarely part of
democratizationmovements and goodworking relations
with other rights groups are the exception rather than
the rule (Krizsan & Roggeband, 2018). In Hungary, links
between the women’s movement and wider democrati-
zation processes and protests were very weak through-
out the last decades and remained incidental even in the
context of anti-democratic threats from the government.
The women’s movement remained largely disconnected
from wider human rights and democratization protests;
they were neither invited to join nor were interested in
joining these platforms. Further, women’s rights claims
were rarely backed by these groups, except for some sup-
port from international rights groups, such as Amnesty
International or Human Rights Watch.
Romanian mobilization in 2012 and Polish protests
in 2016 show the importance of connecting women’s
rights-related protests to wider pro-democracy political
protests in order to prevent the erosion and reversal of
existing gender equality achievements during this contin-
uing wave of de-democratization in the region. In Poland
the protest against restricting abortion extendedwell be-
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yond feminist constituencies, thus integrating feminist
claims into a wider pro-democracy agenda. In Romania,
a coalition with diverse rights groups and integrating
women’s rights in the wider pro-democracy protests
strengthened feminist claims and facilitated policy suc-
cess in blocking further backsliding and adopting new
progressive legislation on domestic violence (Krizsan &
Roggeband, 2018). Thus, the politicization of women’s
rights as an integral part of democratic achievements to
be defended—and not just by women’s rights groups—
emerges as a successful strategy in the Romanian and the
Polish cases.
3.2.3. Abeyance and Demise
While threat and opposition can reinvigorate and
strengthen resistance, if it is systematic and long term,
it may incapacitate weaker and more institutionalized
movements. Abeyance (Taylor, 1989) is a response that
can emerge in such cases. Abeyance is like a last resort,
when a movement is barely able to openly challenge the
state or function as usual. It is a state of survival in which
a social movement manages to sustain itself and mount
a challenge to authorities in a hostile political and cul-
tural environment (Taylor, 1989). Abeyance structures
promote movement continuity by sustaining organiza-
tional infrastructure fromwhich a new protest wavemay
emerge in a different political environment. Amove away
from political activism towards academic feminism, orga-
nizing workshops and small group discussions is also a
strategy that may be used, and is a familiar ground for
many women’s movements in CEE.
We observe a decline and even demise of women’s
movements, which needs to be analysed more system-
atically. In 2016, the state of the previously weak and
underfunded Hungarian women’s movement organiza-
tions can be characterized as abeyance. Hungary had
few women’s movement organizations, and these were
mainly based on highly educated, elite activists and pri-
marily, though not exclusively, centralized in Budapest.
Though their activities were relatively diversified they
were rarely able to mobilize large protests and could
not establish long-term alliances with state actors. The
state has never provided meaningful financial support
for women’s groups, neither at the national nor munici-
pal level, and foreign funding has also beenweak (Krizsan
& Roggeband, 2018). The right-wing populist Fidesz gov-
ernment blocked communication almost entirely, cut
state funding, and restrained foreign funding. This ulti-
mately forced most women’s groups out of business by
2016 and limited resistance to a few isolated activists,
academics and MPs.
4. Conclusion
In this article we have aimed to contribute to recent
debates on de-democratization. We argue that gender
aspects of de-democratization processes are generally
overlooked and their inclusion is crucial for a more com-
prehensive understanding of the consequences of demo-
cratic backsliding for women but also for other marginal-
ized groups. Along with McBride and Mazur we claim
that the quality of democracy can be assessed on the
degree of inclusiveness and representativeness of soci-
etal interests, and more specifically responsiveness to
women’s interests (2010, p. 10). We propose a concep-
tual framework to capture the implications of recent
attacks on gender equality for policy and for women’s
rights advocacy, and more generally for inclusive democ-
racy and the representation of women in politics. To this
end we use Pitkin’s (1967) distinction between descrip-
tive, substantive and symbolic elements of representa-
tion. We propose two arenas where gendered aspects of
de-democratization can be captured: backsliding of gen-
der policies, and changes in feminist engagement with
the political realm.
To map backsliding in gender policies we elaborate a
conceptual framework starting from policy change and
dismantling literature and gender and politics literature.
We distinguish four dimensions of gender equality policy
backsliding: discursive de-legitimization of gender poli-
cies, policy dismantling, undermining implementation,
and erosion of inclusion and accountability mechanisms.
We see these dimensions as interrelated and comple-
mentary. Just like descriptive, substantive and symbolic
representation (Childs& Lovenduski, 2013), these dimen-
sions need to be seen together to capture the full spec-
trum of gender policy backsliding and its implications
for the political representation of women. We propose
that backsliding needs to be understood to mean more
than just the removal or dismantling of policies, to in-
clude subtle and gradual reframing, or the undermining
of implementation capacities such as institutions, plan-
ning or budgets. For backsliding to occur it is not nec-
essary that all dimensions are present simultaneously.
Backsliding may be present in only one dimension, and
not in others. We contend that presence of reversal in
one aspect can be expected to lead to further backsliding
in the policy regime. Discursive de-legitimization of poli-
cies, or broken accountability, may ultimately result in a
change of policy framing or institutional arrangements.
Based on our empirical observations we expect that de-
legitimization is a key element in current processes of
backsliding, and formal policy consequences may not fol-
low directly and immediately. Backsliding appears to af-
fect implementation and institutional arrangements that
support policies, and consultation mechanisms involving
women’s rights advocates. A systematic analysis, apply-
ing our framework, is necessary to know what dimen-
sions are most affected and what specific gender equal-
ity policy issues are most vulnerable to which aspects
of backsliding.
The other arena where gendered aspects of de-
democratization can be identified is engagement of femi-
nist activismwith the political arena. Our framework sug-
gests that backsliding mainly leads to decreased inclu-
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sion of women’s rights advocates in policy processes. For
women, and other groups that are underrepresented in
formal politics, alternative forms of representation such
as consultation and inclusive policy processes are cru-
cial. We see this space declining through marginaliza-
tion or exclusion from consultative platforms, decreased
funding or outright persecution of groups. Yet, back-
sliding and attacks on gender equality could also have
reinvigorating effects on feminist mobilization. Diversi-
fication of organizational forms, mobilization strategies
and funding may be new forms of engagement. We ar-
gue that the blocking of institutional channels of rep-
resentation through policy consultation forces feminists
to seek other non-institutional channels like confronta-
tional street protest. In particular, mass protests and
building new inclusive coalitions are important tools to
draw attention to the underrepresentation of women.
More of these grassroots initiatives may also lead to new
innovative forms of activism that might previously have
been non-existent in the fragile democracies of the CEE
region. At the same time, if movements are not able to
generate such massive support they more likely turn to
abeyance tactics.
Strategies of resistance will partly depend on the
patterns of backsliding. Active dismantling of policies
will more likely generate disruptive protests and wide
coalitions of protest. Meanwhile, high levels of mobiliza-
tion and active coalition work in ideologically inconsis-
tent coalitions are difficult to sustain over the long term,
in cases of incremental backsliding. Gradual and subtle
forms of backsliding make feminist responses more diffi-
cult as they require evidence to pinpoint the change and
communicating this in order to mobilize constituencies
and bystanders. Also, gradual backsliding makes it nec-
essary for movements to be able to sustain their activity
over a longer time, while resources are declining.
Our framework for analysing women’s movement
resistances can show emerging possibilities for re-
democratization by strong articulation of protest, and
by forging new alliances. It also opens opportunities for
identifying patterns of re-gendering or gendering democ-
racy in certain cases where feminists failed on previ-
ous occasions. Research on feminist activismmay inform
analysis of activism of other marginalized groups in con-
texts of de-democratization.
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